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Popping the Question: The Question of Popular Culture  





“Discourses and fantasies of cannibalism occupied” - as you sustained in 
“Cannibalism and the Chinese Body Politic: Hermeneutics and Violence 
in Cross-Cultural Perception” – “a crucial liminal space where the 
presumptive limits of human society are simultaneously challenged and 
implicitly reaffirmed.” Taking into account the growing cross-cultural 
transnational environment, as well as the Sinophone articulations that 
characterize popular culture and the discontinuous flows of equivalence 
and alterity that it promotes, what would be, in your opinion, the 
rearrangements in the abstract models of subjectivization and 
subjugation that operate nowadays in the complex and rapidly changing 
Chinese cultural context?  
 
I made this observation about a decade ago, in the context of a discussion of 
allusions to cannibalism (metaphorical or actual) in a variety of Sinophone works, 
including essays, novels, and performance art, and simultaneously proposed that the 
figure of cannibalism offers a useful metaphor for understanding contemporary 
patterns of socio-cultural interaction, particularly across ethnic or national 
boundaries. For instance, I opened with a discussion of a performance work by the 
Chinese artist Zhu Yu, who took pictures of himself consuming what he claimed was 
an actual human infant. Somehow, images of the performance then began to 
circulate (out of context) over the Internet and in print media, until eventually a 
Malaysian newspaper reprinted them with the claim that a restaurant in Taiwan was 
serving actual human fetuses as food. I argued that the metaphor of cannibalism 
offers a useful way of understanding not only the way that human society has 
traditionally differentiated itself from its radical other (with cannibalism being a 
paradigmatic marker of that which lies outside the sphere of humanity), but also the 
way in which it simultaneously relies on fantasy of alterity to buttress its own self-
understanding.  
I believe the observation remains applicable today, as communities around the world 
become increasingly intertwined while at the same time being highly motivated to 
differentiate themselves from one another. In the Zhu Yu example cited above, for 
instance, the trope of cannibalism circulates through Mainland China, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, and beyond, and in each case it offers a site of strategic disidentification—
permitting a wide array of different groups to claim, “we are not that which this 
represents.”   
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In reality, what we observe here is a phenomenon that Freud calls the narcissism of 
small differences, wherein communities or groups are most highly motivated to 
distinguish themselves from precisely those groups whom otherwise they most 
closely resemble. In a global Sinophone context, it is precisely the underlying cultural 
commonalities that unite many regions with large Chinese populations that 
frequently motivate those same regions to strategically differentiate themselves from 
each other.  
 
According to Julia Lovell in the introduction to her translation of The 
Complete Fiction of Lu Xun (2010), Mao once acknowledged that Lu 
Xun, due to his burning satire and freezing irony, would “either have 
gone silent, or gone to prison”, had he lived on through the political 
violence unleashed in China from the 1950s onwards. Contrary to this 
opinion, at least much of his writing did indeed survive and is just 
starting to go silent, paradoxically, now, 25 years into the era of reform 
and opening. In 2007, Beijing removed “The True Story of Ah Q” from 
teaching materials for high school seniors; in 2009, newspapers 
reported that the number of Lu Xun’s essays included in the curriculum 
was steadily declining; in 2013, People’s Education Press removed Lu 
Xun’s essay “The Kite” from seventh grade textbooks. Meanwhile, the 
study of Confucius is reemerging, with Confucius Institutes opening 
around the world, where children, dressed in ancient robes, recite the 
sage’s aphorisms. In 2014, Chinese President and Chairman of the 
Communist Party Xi Jinping even gave a speech at the official 
commemoration of Confucius’s 2,565th birthday. How can this actual 
change of assessment be read, bearing in mind that these two enduring 
authors, both crucial names in Chinese popular culture, were praised 
and recognized as models of correctness to battle the devil with 
passionate seriousness of rightness and purpose?  
 
The point has often been made that Mao, as early as his “Talks at the Yan’an Forum” 
in 1942, lionized the recently deceased Lu Xun (stating approvingly that, “Living 
under the rule of the dark forces and deprived of freedom of speech, Lu Xun used 
burning satire and freezing irony, cast in the form of essays, to do battle; and he was 
entirely right”), precisely so that Lu Xun’s works and his legacy could be 
appropriated as a symbol of the communist regime Mao was still attempting to bring 
to reality, as opposed to serving as a symbol of opposition and dissent. At the same 
4 
 
time, many scholars have observed that, had Lu Xun survived into the Maoist era, he 
almost certainly would have been tempted to leverage his satirical and critical energy 
against the Maoist regime itself.  
Lu Xun died in 1936, and while it is certainly true that his works remained in wide 
circulation in China after that, the result was very different from if he himself had 
survived into the Maoist period. Most authors who were active in the 1930s and 
1940s basically stopped writing creatively after 1949, and there were very few who 
were not at some point persecuted on political grounds.  
As for China’s current practice of pulling Lu Xun’s works from high school textbooks 
while at the same time promoting the study of Confucius, this is indeed a curious set 
of new developments. Confucius was, of course, explicitly critiqued under Mao, as a 
symbol of “feudal China,” but contemporary China is apparently capitalizing on the 
emphasis on New Confucianism among scholars not only in China but also Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and the U.S. Lionel Jensen has argued, in Manufacturing 
Confucianism, that the figure of Confucius is the product of a fundamental 
reinvention on the part of sixteenth and seventeenth century Jesuit missionaries, 
who were looking for Chinese equivalents for the Christian narratives and values that 
they were attempting to promote. To the extent that this argument has validity, it is 
ironic that, at the contemporary moment, we find China and other Sinophone 
countries and regions reinventing a Confucian legacy once again, precisely in order 
to differentiate themselves from modern incarnations of the same sorts of Western 
traditions that the early Jesuit missionaries represented in the first place.  
 
In April 2014, during the Beijing International Film Festival, American 
filmmaker Oliver Stone contended that “Mao Zedong has been lionized 
in dozens and dozens of Chinese films, but never criticized”. He also 
argued that it is time for Chinese directors to confront the nation’s past, 
for only that would “stir the waters” and “allow true creativity to 
emerge” in the country. Long before this occasion, scholars such as Liu 
Kang have contended likewise that Chinese contemporary dominant 
narratives on modernity have been continually and deliberately eliding 
and concealing China’s revolutionary legacy (Liu, 2004: 28). Do you 
think that an acknowledgement of the bitter sides of recent history 
through film and other forms of popular culture would actually be an 
important move that would allow China to both reconcile with its past 




Actually, there are in fact quite a few films and other cultural works that examine 
“the bitter sides of recent (Chinese) history.” There are, for instance, a large number 
of films that critically examine the brutality of the Cultural Revolution, with some of 
the best-known examples including Zhang Yimou’s To Live and Chen Kaige’s 
Farewell my Concubine. The documentary filmmaker Wu Wenguang and several of 
his colleagues are currently producing a series of documentaries focusing on the 
hardships people endured during the Great Famine that resulted from the policy 
errors associated with the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s. There is also a large 
body of literature that explores these and related issues. For instance, in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, there was a body of literary production known as “scar 
literature,” which revolved around the hardships people endured during the Cultural 
Revolution. More recently, some more self-reflective works examine similar 
concerns. For instance, Yan Lianke, an author with whom I work closely, has written 
thoughtfully and critically about a wide range of recent historical issues, including 
the Great Leap Forward and the resulting famine (The Four Books), China’s rural 
AIDS epidemic (Dream of Ding Village), and the ideological excesses of the Cultural 
Revolution (Serve the People).  
 
As China undergoes an economic transformation ten times the speed of 
the first Industrial Revolution, it seems that people are, at the same 
time, turning to ancient ideas for a complex connection to the past and 
historical periods such as the “Century of Humiliation”.  This puts the 
West and China in the curious position of facing rivalry while their own 
citizens are sharing more and more of the same tastes, jokes, pop culture 
entertainment, products and pleasures that are sometimes used to 
criticize, censure and condemn. Thus, the slow, steady accretion of 
global popular culture has given people on both sides cultural products 
that may encourage them to think more about what they have in 
common with one another than, maybe, ever before. How do these 
countervailing cultural interactions impact, in your opinion, the 
resonating notion of self-conscious Chineseness? 
 
Yes, it is true that it is becoming increasingly easy for popular culture to circulate 
transnationally. However, it is equally true that culture does not circulate evenly or 
homogenously. Certain types of works are more likely to circulate beyond their site of 
(putative) origin than others, and even works that do circulate widely may be 
understood differently in different regional or cultural settings. Moreover, there is a 
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generally asymmetrical relationship between the dissemination of nominally 
“Western” culture and “Asian” culture (i.e., it is much easier for something like the 
Harry Potter series to achieve global recognition than a comparable nominally “non-
Western” work like Jin Yong’s wuxia novels or Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon).  
Actually, what interests me most about your question is the reference to a 
“resonating notion of self-conscious chineseness.” What is perhaps most interesting 
about the transnational circulation of cultural products in and beyond contemporary 
Sinophone communities is the degree to which they underscore the diverse ways in 
which “Chineseness” itself is understood. Many of Jin Yong’s best-selling novels, for 
instance, feature characters belonging to a wide array of different Sinitic ethnic 
groups, and Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon famously features actors 
from a variety of different backgrounds, many of whom speak Chinese with a 
strikingly different accent. I would argue, therefore, that the increasingly 
transregional and transnational character of contemporary popular culture not only 
has the potential to bring people from diverse backgrounds into a common dialogue, 
it simultaneously has the ability to encourage different groups to reflect on what 
distinguishes them from one another—including different communities that might 
otherwise be grouped under the broader umbrella category of “chineseness.”  
 
Bearing influence from the works of the Yunnan School of modern 
Chinese painting (Yunnan Huapai), the Fifth Generation film 
productions such as Tian Zhuangzhuang’s On the Hunting Ground 
(1985) and Horse Thief (1987), and also from the state policies 
encouraging ethnic and cultural tourism, national ethnic minorities have 
gained considerable visibility in post-Mao Chinese mainstream popular 
culture. From literature and photography, to music, cuisine and fashion, 
ethnic influences have therefore become a noticeable presence in the 
mass-based realms of Chinese contemporary cultural life. Considering 
this, how do you think minority ethnicity is being represented and 
negotiated in twenty-first century China’s popular culture, and in what 
ways are these representations contributing to the unfolding of new 
perceptions of local ethnic cultures and the portraying of new images 
concerning China’s national identity? 
 
There has been a longstanding practice, in post-1949 China, of focusing the socio-
cultural characteristics (e.g., distinctive songs, dress styles, and so forth) that 
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ostensibly distinguish China’s different minority ethnic groups from one another, 
and also from the Han majority. This practice has continued into the twenty-first 
century, particularly as China’s inner border regions increasingly become profitable 
tourist destinations. At the same time, there is a growing interest among some ethnic 
minority groups in gaining greater control over their own cultural representation, 
and this is particularly true among groups (such as Uighurs and Tibetans) that are 
viewed by the Chinese state as politically sensitive. There is a fine line between 
cultural representations that reinforce existing stereotypes, and ones that sensitively 
explore ethnocultural difference. One relevant factor involves who is creating and 
promoting these cultural representations, though it should be emphasized that it is 
not uncommon for minority groups to reproduce and reinforce cultural stereotypes 
promoted by state-sponsored discourses, and it is equally possible to individuals who 
do not belong to a particular ethnic group to produce cultural works that examine 
the distinctive qualities of that group in a sensitive and productive manner.  
 
China’s box office surged ahead by 36% to hit $4.82 billion in 2014, 
consolidating China as the second-largest film market after the US. The 
prospect of the Chinese market is so alluring that some U.S. 
entertainment companies seem willing to barter away their hard-won 
creative freedom in order to break into it. Nowadays, 34 Hollywood films 
are allowed to be shown in China each year, based on an agreement 
struck between the two countries in 2012. Some of those films are 
specially adapted for the Chinese market. How does that affect the 
processes of identification and differentiation of both filmic discursive 
traditions? What are the possible consequences of rearranging these 
popular culture signs to produce new cultural meanings and identities? 
 
The precipitous growth of China’s box office has raised a number of interesting 
issues. On one hand, Hollywood is increasingly producing films with an eye to the 
Chinese market—and in some cases it has either altered films to accommodate 
Chinese sensibilities (e.g., Red Dawn), or else has released an alternative version 
intended specifically for the Chinese market (e.g., Iron Man 3). At the same time, 
this same growth has encouraged the production of a growing number of high-
quality films from China itself, together with a large number of co-productions that 




Considering popular culture as an important site for the circulation, 
production and contestation of relations of power, how has it 
contributed to the formation of Hong Kong’s contemporary cultural 
identity? And in which ways has it been evoking the changing cultural 
status of the territory in the last few decades and the complex 
relationship with Mainland China, especially after the handover? 
 
One of the consequences of the 1984 agreement to “return” Hong Kong to PRC 
control in 1997 was a concerted interest in the question of Hong Kong identity, 
particularly as it pertains to the cultural arena. This question has remained an object 
of considerable interest in the years following the Handover. To cite just one 
example, between 1997 and 1999 the Hong Kong director Fruit Chan released his 
“Hong Kong trilogy,” which examines the consequences of the Handover from a 
variety of different perspectives. More recently, in 2014, he released the horror film 
The Midnight After, which featured a small group of survivors in a dystopian version 
of Hong Kong that has suddenly been transformed into a virtually empty ghost town. 
The apocalyptic tone of Fruit Chan’s film, which is based on a popular Internet novel 
that was released the preceding year, pairs ironically and suggestively with the 
Umbrella Movement that was launched just months after the film’s Hong Kong 
debut. Watched closely in Hong Kong, China, and around the world, the Umbrella 
Movement was a bold and widely-supported intervention into the question of Hong 
Kong’s sociopolitical status in the post-Handover era, though its long-term effects 
remain to be seen.  
 
